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Notes
The Constiiutionality and Basic Fairness
of ihe Government Drivers Law
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing use of motor vehicles by the federal government1 coupled with the increasing rate of highway accidents has
led to an unavoidable problem-an increasing number of citizens
with claims arising from the negligent driving of government employees. Three conflicting interests are immediately apparent:
1) the victim's interest in just compensation for his personal injuries and property damage; 2) the government driver's interest
in avoiding personal liability while acting within the scope of
his employment, and 3) the federal government's interest both
in protecting employees so that they may conscientiously perform their duties and in the maintenance of an efficient, economical method of settling the claims for which it may be vicariously liable. Another interest, although not as readily apparent,
is that of the taxpaying public in having the federal government
act in a proper fiduciary role when allocating the burden of
money damages. Society, of course, has a further interest in
deterring motor vehicle accidents by encouraging Government
drivers, like all other drivers, to be safety conscious.
In 1961, Congress resolved these conflicting interests by enacting the Government Drivers Law2 as an amendment to the
Federal Tort Claims Act.3 The Law grants personal immunity
1. The General Services Administration, as transportation manager for a large sector of the federal government, increased its pool of
vehicles from 21,009 in 1961 to 50,148 in 1967, an increase of nearly
250 percent in a mere six years. 1967 GEN. SERvs. ADm IsTRATION,
ADW'Rs ANN. REP. 41; 1961 GEu. SFavs. ADm IsTRATiON, ANN. REP. oF
THE ADM'R OF GEN.

SERVs. 6.

2. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (Supp. MI,1968):
The remedy against the United States provided [under the Federal Tort Claims Act] for injury or loss of property or personal
injury or death, resulting from the opeation by any employee
of the Government of any motor vehicle while acting within
the scope of his ... employment, shall herafter be exclusive of
any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or his estate whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
3. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60
Stat. 812 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The basic judicial remedy is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) (1964).
[T]he district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages
...for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
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to negligent government drivers while acting within the scope
of their employment and provides victims with an exclusive remedy against the federal government for the driver's misconduct.
The immediate question posed by the law is its constitutionality
under the fifth and seventh amendments to the United States
Constitution. Of equal importance is the basic fairness of the
scheme to all interested parties.
The problem created by govermnent drivers is unique in the
sense that in no other activity are government employees constantly in such potentially tortious contact with the majority of
private citizens. This Note will present the law in the context
of its background, point out the existing problems of constitutionality and fairness and propose possible solutions to accommodate the various interests affected.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

THE Docmnw OF SOVEREIGN LmmnI-Y

Sovereign immunity is a legal concept used by courts to
give a governmental unit a "favored" status as a defendant in
order to protect it from liability.4 While the doctrine's origin is
uncertain, 5 the underlying philosophy of English common law
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any

employee of the Government while acting within the scope of
his ...
employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
The basic administrative remedy is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2672
(1964), as amended, (Supp. III, 1968).
The head of each Federal agency . . . may consider, ascertain,
adjust, determine, compromise, and settle any claim for money
damages against the United States for injury or loss of property
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the agency while acting
within the scope of his . . . employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred ....
4. There are a number of other classes of defendants that the law
has made immune for various policy reasons, e.g., charities, public
officers and members of a family with respect to each other. W. PRosSER, LAW OF TORTS

996 (3d ed. 1964).

See generally Borchard, Govern-

ment Liability in Tort, 26 CAw. B. REv. 399 (1948); Davis, Tort Liability
of Governmental Units, 40 Mmm. L. Rrv. 751 (1956); James, Tort Liability of Government Units and Their Officers, 22 U. COr. L. REv. 610
(1955).
5. It may well have had its roots in Roman law. See Parker,
The King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministration, 5 VAND.
L. Rav. 167 (1952).
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that "the King could do no wrong"6 led to the idea that it would
be a contradiction of his sovereignty to allow him to be sued in
his own courts.7 In 1821, the doctrine was first applied to our8
government when Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia,
giving no reasons, adopted the doctrine. Subsequent applications of the doctrine soon established the principle that the federal government could not be sued without its consent.9 As a
result of the failure of courts to provide relief against the Government, the practice developed of providing relief through private bills for injuries caused by the Government-not as a matter
of right, but as a matter of legislative grace.' 0 Over the years,
an increasing number of such private bills placed a strain on
Congress and the practice resulted in injustice to many unheard
citizens." At times, the Supreme Court felt obliged to circumvent the immunity doctrine in the name of "justice.'12

Criticism

of the fairness of this means for redressing grievances finally led
to the establishment of a Court of Claims in 1863, though it
lacked general tort jurisdiction. 1 3 Areas of "consent" were
broadened by limited waivers of immunity under the Tucker
Act, the Patent Infringement Act, the Suits in Admiralty Act,
the Public Vessels Act and many others. 14
6. For recognition of this phraseology, see Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the Crown, 38 L.Q. REv. 280 (1922).
7. 1 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *237. See also Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 49 (1793).
8. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 82 (1821). See Briggs v. Light Boat Upper
Cedar Point, 93 Mass. (11 Allen) 157, 162 (1865).
9. The traditional statement is that of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907):
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends.
See The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1921). See also United States v.
McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846); Hill v. United States, 50 U.S.
(9How.) 385 (1850).
10. The first bill was passed in 1790 and the first tort bill in 1792.
Yankwich, Problems Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9 F.R.D. 143
(1949). See generally McCabe, Observations on the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 3 THE FORUM 66 (Jan.1968).

11. McCabe,supra note 10, at 67.
12. See, e.g., The Siren, 74 U.S. (7Wall.) 152 (1868); United States
v.Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
13. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 998. The Court of Claims, 28

U.S.C. § 2501 et. seq. (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1968), was established in 1855 by Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, but did
not receive its present power to enter final judgments until amended
by Act of March 3,1863, ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765.
14. Yankwich, supra note 10, at 148. See generally Note, Tort
Claims againstthe United States, 30 GEO. L.J. 462 (1942).
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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

In 1946, Congress took a very significant step by enacting
the Federal Tort Claims Act 15 which broadly waived the Government's immunity from tort liability." The constitutional basis
for the Act is article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution, which confers power upon Congress "to pay the debts ...
of the United States."' 7
The purpose of the Act's broad waiver of sovereign immunity was to provide citizens with a "satisfactory remedy" for the
"common law" type of tort resulting from the negligent or
wrongful acts or omissions of federal employees while acting
within the scope of their employment.' 8 The Act's legislative
history makes this clear:
With the expansion of governmental activities in recent years,
it becomes especially important to grant to private individuals
the right to sue the Government in respect to such torts as
negligence in the operation of vehices. 19

The waiver of immunity, however, is subject to a number
of specific exclusions, some of which deny relief for a great many
claims. 20 One exclusion, which denies claims for employees'
exercise of, or failure to exercise, discretionary functions, has
15. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, tit. IV, 60 Stat.
812 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The original Act
placed a ban on consideration of private bills. For the basic remedial
language, see note 3 supra.
16. President Truman deserves some degree of credit for the Act
becoming law on August 2, 1946. A tort claims bill had passed Congress
as early as 1928 only to be pocket vetoed by President Coolidge.
Gottlieb, Symposium on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 24 FED. B.J. 136
(1964).
17. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587 (1941); Ex
parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929).
18. Milva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy The Emperor Has
No Clothes, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 828, 832 (1966).
19. S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 adopting and quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1946).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1964). The section is devoted solely to placing limits on the activities for which the Government may be held
liable and among others excludes:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee
of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation ... or based upon the exercise ... or the
failure to exercise... a discretionary function... on the part
of... an employee of the Government ....
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights.
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caused the most litigation because of the difficulty of interpreting "discretionary function." 21 Claims arising from the "loss,
miscarriage, or negligent transmission" of mail are also excluded
from relief22 but this does not apply to personal injury claims
arising out of the negligent operation of mail vehicles. 23 Another
significant exclusion denies relief from claims based upon the
commission of intentional torts. 24 Since the Act's language of
"wrongful act or omission" has been construed to exclude strict
liability,25 the Act will only provide relief for claims arising out
of negligent or willful misconduct by government employees.
With regard to nonexcluded activities, the Act provides for
the administrative settlement of tort claims.2 0 In the event that
a mutually satisfactory settlement cannot be reached, the claim
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964). See note 20 supra. In construing
the ambiguous language, courts seem to agree that the Government is
immune with respect to decisions made at the "planning level" and
liable for decisions made at the "operational level." The further ambiguity of these terms, however, makes reconciliation of cases difficult.
See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (liable
for failure of government lighthouse); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953) (immune for fertilizer explosion); Eastern Air Lines,
Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (liable for faulty
instructions given by federal airport tower controller); Dolphin Gardens,
Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965) (immune for
gases due to dredging of river bottom).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (b) (1964) See note 20 supra.
23. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that in view of the
broad and remedial purpose of the Act, the doctrine of strict construction should not be applied so as to enlarge the exclusions. See United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). In fact, mail vehicle
collisions are one of the largest sources of claims brought under the
Federal Tort Claims Act. See, e.g., Nistendirk v. McGee, 225 F. Supp.
881 (W.D. Mo. 1963) (rural mail carrier); Jones v. United States, 265
F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (postal truck).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (h) (1964). See note 20 supra. Misrepresentation in all forms whether negligent or intentional or whether arising
from an affirmative act or a failure to act has been held to be excluded
by this section. See, e.g., United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696
(1961); Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); National Mfg. Co. v. United States,
210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954).
25. The construction is based upon the premise that strict liability

is not based on fault and that the Government must be at fault to be

liable. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Harris v.
United States, 205 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1953). The validity of the premise has been strongly denounced. See James, The Federal Tort Claims
Act and the "DiscretionaryFunction" Exception, 10 U. F". L. REv. 184
(1957); Peck, Absolute Liability and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 9
STAN. L. REv. 433 (1957).

26. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 11I, 1968).
note 3 supra for the relevant text.

See
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may be adjudicated in the federal district courts.27 The Act imposes liability on the Government "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances" 28 in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction where
the tort occurs. 29 The relief provided by the Act, however, is
somewhat more restricted than would generally be available under state law. A major amendment enacted in 1966 requires that
before suit can be brought, the claimant must request administrative relief from the government agency whose driver is alleged to be involved.30 If the claim is denied or the claimant
is dissatisfied with the amount offered, he may bring suit in federal district court 3 l but the amount requested must not exceed
the amount of the claim presented administratively.32 Furthermore, all actions brought under the Act must be tried without a
jury,3 3 regardless of whether the action is in the nature of a direct claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim.34 The
claim must be presented within two years of the time at which
the cause of action arose. If the claim is denied or if the claimant is dissatisfied with the agency's offer, suit must be brought
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).

text.

See note 3 supra for the relevant

28. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964). See Big Head v. United States, 166
F. Supp. 510 (D. Mont. 1958).
29. The whole law of the state where the misconduct occurs governs, including the conflicts of law rules which, interestingly enough,

generally apply the law of the state where the misconduct has its
harmful effect, not where the misconduct occurs. See Richards v.
United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1968):
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the
United States . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the aupropriate Federal agency and his
claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing

The amendment, Pub. L. No. 89-506, § 2(a), 80 Stat. 306 (1966), applies
only to claims arising after Jan. 18, 1967.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964). This, of course, requires that the
suit conform to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and thus, pursuant to the Federal Venue Statute, the action must be brought in either
the district where the claimant resides or the district where the wrongful act occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1964).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. III, 1968). An
exception is made by the Act "where the increased amount is based
upon newly discovered evidence . . . or upon allegation and proof of
intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim." See Morgan v.
United States, 123 F. Supp. 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1964).
34. United States v. Rosati, 97 F. Supp. 747 (D.N.J. 1951). Likewise, the claimant would probably be denied a jury trial with respect
to a counterclaim brought by the federal government. See McElrath
v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880).
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within six months of the agency's action.85 While the Act provides for post-judgment interest at the rate of four percent,
it exempts the Government from paying any interest prior to
final judgment regardless of the state law on the matter. 5 Except where state law provides exclusively for punitive damages
in case of death, the Act exempts the federal government from
liability for punitive damages. 37 Attorney's fees are specifically
limited to 20 percent of administrative awards and 25 percent of
judicial recoveries. 38 Finally, the Act has been construed to allow the government to be impleaded and become liable not only
for contribution as a joint tortfeasor 39 but for indemnity to em40
ployees' insurers on subrogation claims.
C.

THE GoVERm-MENT DEIVEs LAW

Prior to the enactment of the Government Drivers Law, a
person involved in a motor vehicle accident with a federal employee acting within the scope of his employment had a choice of
defendants. 4 ' He could either sue the employee by asserting his
common law right against the tortfeasor 42 or go against the gov35. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. HI, 1968). If
the claim has been timely submitted but no notice of denial has been
mailed, six months after presentation the claimant may consider the
claim denied and begin suit. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1964), as amended,
(Supp. I1, 1968). See also Corboy, The Revised Federal Tort Claims
Act: A Practitioner'sView, 2 THE FORUm 67 (Jan. 1967).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1964). Some state courts allow interest
on the general principle of compensating for the delay which occurs
between the date of the injury and the date of the award, especially in

the case of property damage. See, e.g., King v. Southern Pacific Co., 109
Cal. 96, 41 P. 786 (1895). Other jurisdictions have statutes providing
for the payment of interest from the time of filing suit. See, e.g.,
Callaham v. Slavsky, 153 Colo. 291, 385 P.2d 674 (1963).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964). Where a death occurs and the state
law provides only for punitive damages, the recovery of "actual or
compensatory" damages is allowed. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1964), as amended, (Supp. HI 1968).
39. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1951). Of
course, the claimant may seek recovery in a separate proceeding.
See, e.g., Keleket X-Ray Corp. v. United States, 275 F.2d 167 (D.C.
Cir. 1960).
40. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949);
Old Colony Ins. Co. v. United States, 168 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1948). But
voluntary assignments, as distinguished from assignments by operation
of law, transfer no valid rights against the United States. See United
States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288 (1952).
41. Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1394, 1396 (1967). For a good historical
discussion, see McCord, Fault Without Liability: Immunity of Federal
Employees, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 849 (1966).
42. See United States v. First Sec. Bank, 208 F.2d 424 (10th Cir.
1953); Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1953).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:645

eminent on the basis of respondeat superior.43 This imposed a
financial burden on government employees since they were
forced to carry their own liability fmsurance 44 or risk personal
liability in the course of official duty.15
The Government Drivers Law, enacted to alleviate this financial burden, substitutes the liability of the Government exclusively for that of its drivers while acting within the scope of
their employment and thereby renders government drivers absolutely immune.46 The scheme used to accomplish this appears
'47
to be "unique in Anglo-American law.
The Law applies only to government drivers; 48 other employees may still be sued for their torts individually or jointly
with the federal government. 49 The driver also remains solely
responsible for torts committed while acting outside the scope
of his employment.50 In addition the Law applies only to claims
which are otherwise covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act,51
43. Under the Tort Claims Act, the Government's liability is determined by conventional respondeat superior principles. See, e.g.,
Williams v. United States, 350 U.S. 857 (1955); United States v. Holcombe, 277 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1960).
44. Since the federal government, unlike most employers, carries
no liability insurance for employees acting within the scope of their
duties, employees felt financially compelled to carry their own. This,
of course, resulted in a financial burden on employees measured by the
following: (1) To employees using their own family vehicle on the job,
the difference in cost between a "personal" rate policy and a "business"
rate policy on the family vehicle. (2) TO employees using their employer's vehicle, the cost of a "business" rate policy on the employer's
vehicle.
45. S. REP. No. 736, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-6 (1961); H.R. REP.
No. 297, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1961); 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2784. See also Whealton v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 770 (E.D.
Va. 1967); Perez v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. I1, 1968).
See, e.g., Beesley v. United States, 364 F.2d 194 (10th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Delta Indus. Inc., 275 F. Supp. 934 (N.D. Ohio 1966).
47. McCabe, supra note 10, at 77.
48. Other government employees are protected by no comparable
provision under the Tort Claims Act, except for certain Veteran's Administration medical personnel with respect to malpractice claims.
38 U.S.C. § 4116 (1964), as amended, (Supp. Ill, 1968).
49. Joinder of otter employees in the same suit with the federal
government is permitted. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340
U.S. 543 (1951).
50. See 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.Nmrws 2784, 2787:
Therefore the new language would only apply when the employee is acting in his official capacity at the time of the incident giving rise to the claim, and does not provide the basis
for any liability against the United States based on the unauthorized use of Government motor vehicles.
51. L. JAYSoN, HANDLING FEDmuL TORT CLAIMS § 175.03 (1967).
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thereby providing no immunity to drivers who commit inten-

52
tional torts or who are responsible for the loss of mail.

Even though the Law precludes suits against government
drivers in their personal capacity, a procedure has been estab53
lished to dispose of such a suit if brought in a state court.
The Attorney General is required to defend any action brought
in any court against a government driver for misconduct within
the scope of his employment 4 and any action brought in
a state court must be removed to a federal district court before the federal government may properly be joined. 5 To accomplish removal and joinder, the Attorney General must present a certificate issued by the appropriate agency wherein the
agency admits that the driver was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time of the alleged misconduct. 56 After removal, but before trial on the merits, any party may move to
remand and if the court finds that the government driver was
not acting within the scope of his employment, the case will be
remanded to the state court. 57 If the court, however, finds that
the government driver was acting within the scope of his employment, he is absolutely immune and is dismissed from the proceeding. The suit is then deemed to be a tort action against the
federal government under the Federal Tort Claim Act and
58
thereby subject to such qualifications as the Act provides.
52. See text accompanying notes 22 &24 supra.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c)-(e) (1964).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c) (1964). To insure that the Attorney General can appear and defend the suit, government drivers are required to
deliver papers served upon them to their superiors who in turn must
promptly furnish copies to the United States Attorney. Id.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1964), as amended, (Supp. IH, 1968). If
the Attorney General does not certify scope of employment, the action apparently cannot be removed to federal court, nor can a hearing
be held on the scope of employment issue. Thus, the government driver
will unavoidably be subject to personal liability regardless of whether
he was actually within the scope of his employment. See Jarrell v.
Gordy, 162 So. 2d 577 (La. Ct. App. 1964). Once having certified, however, the Attorney General is not entitled to withdraw certification
and have the action remanded to state court. Stephen v. Madison, 223
F. Supp. 256 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1964), as amended, (Supp. EEI, 1968).
See Adams v. Jackel, 220 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). The district
court may even order a hearing on the scope of employment issue
upon its own motion. See Reynaud v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 945
(W.D. Mo. 1966).
58. See Lipinski v. Bartko, 237 F. Supp. 688 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
While not expressly stated, the same procedures must be followed
when the action is initially brought in a federal district court in order to
substitute the federal government for the driver except, of course, no
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III. THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
The remedy afforded by the Government Drivers Law raises
serious questions as to its constitutionality under the fifth and
seventh amendments. The unique nature of the Law's provisions means that the same questions have never arisen with regard to any other law.
A. DEPRIVATION OF CommvIoN LAW RwEDY
The Government Drivers Law grants victims of motor vehicle accidents caused by government drivers an exclusive remedy of suit against the federal government. 9 This means that
the victim is completely deprived of his common law cause of
action against the tortfeasor-a right recognized in every state in
the United States.60
Under the United States Constitution, Congress has the express power "to pay the Debts . . .of the United States" 61 and,
by the necessary and proper clause,62 has the implied power to
choose appropriate means to accomplish this. Since McCulloch
v. Maryland 3 in 1819, federal legislation has been upheld if
the ends are legitimate and the meams are reasonably related
to the attainment of those ends. 64 It can hardly be doubted that
relieving government drivers from the financial burden of carrying liability insurance on official duty is a legitimate end. 5 But
a cause of action is a property right and the abolition of old
removal is required. See Perez v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 571
(S.D.N.Y. 1963). But where the Attorney General does not certify scope

of employment, upon the driver's motion a federal court has allowed a

determination of the issue by a jury at Lrial. See Jones v. Polishuk,

252 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1968).
This section should be interpreted in view of its accompanying amendments. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c)-(e) (1964). See note 53 supra.
60. In fact 37 states have constitutional provisions guaranteeing a "certain remedy for every wrong." See, e.g., Almn. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8. See also Note, Constitutional Guarantees of a Certain Remedy, 49
IowA

L. REv. 1202 (1964).

For the effect of these provisions on state

legislation, see Comment, Abolition of Breach of Promise in WisconsinScope and Constitutionality,43 MARQ. L. Rri. 341 (1960).
61. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
62. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
63. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819).

64. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).

See also Union

Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.
v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906).
65. See 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2789 (legislative history

of the Government Drivers Law).
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common law causes of action as a reasonable means to attain a
permissible legislative objective6 6 is a denial of due process un67
less a substantial and efficient remedy remains or is provided.
In 1963, only two years after the enactment of the Government Drivers Law, two cases passed lightly over the issue of
constitutionality, both upholding the validity of the exclusive
remedy against the federal government. In Gustafson v. Peck, 8
a federal district court denied the existence of a "constitutional
right to a cause of action against a government employee for
committing a tort while acting within the scope of his employment."60 The court based this conclusion on the premise that
the Government is immune from suit except where consent has
been given and, therefore, congressional intent determines
whether or not a government driver is granted immunity.71
Since the Law expressly declares the tortfeasor immune,72 there
is really no question that the requisite intent for the driver to
avoid direct liability is present. The court, however, added that
the Law probably does not "completely obliterate the liability of
the individual tortfeasor. '' 73 This interpretation of the "exclusive remedy" may be the real reason for the court's result.
In Nistendirk v. McGee,74 another federal district court focused more directly on the issue of whether or not Congress
could validly replace this common law right with a statutory
one.75 After finding that the legislative objective was a permissible one, the court stated that whether or not the Government Drivers Law accomplishes the objective was not open
66. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929); Louis Pizitz Dry
Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112 (1927); New York Cent. R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243
U.S. 219 (1917).
67. Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933); Crane v. Hahlo,
258 U.S. 142 (1922); Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437
(1903).

68. 216 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Iowa 1963).

69.
70.
U.S. 381,
See text
71.

Id. at 372.
Id. The court cited Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306
388 (1938) ; Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
accompanying note 9 supra.
216 F. Supp. 370, 372 (N.D. Iowa 1963).

72. The court supported its stand by a reading of legislative
history stating that "the remedy against the United States is to be exclusive and is to protect the Government drivers against the hazard of
being subjected to suits." Id. at 373.
73. Id. at 372.
74. 225 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
75. The court analogized the Government Drivers Law to the numerous workmen's compensation statutes. Id. at 882.
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to judicial inquiry. 7
From this alone, the court concluded
that the statutory remedy was not violative of due process since
it provided a substantial and efficient remedy.77 Thus, the court
concluded with the precise issue that must be determined,
namely whether the exclusive remedy provided against the Government is substantial and efficient.
More recently, however, the question of whether an adequate substitute is provided was answered in the negative. In
Jenkins v. United States,7 8 a federal district court held that the
Government Drivers Law is a denial of due process:
While it is true that under the Tort Claims Act the government
is subject to suit only through consent, it is also clear that its
substantive liability under [the Government Drivers Law] is
merely vicarious in nature under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Thus, plaintiff's common law right to sue the active
tortfeasor is completely abridged ... [The legislative objective] is not sufficient to allow the government to deprive the
plaintiff of his common law right .... 7
The legal significance of the Jenkins holding is that the exclusive
remedy provided by the Law is nol; a substantial and efficient
substitute for the common law remedy, at least in the eyes of one
federal district court.
The only pertinent Supreme Court language indicates that
the Jenkins decision may be meritorious. In Richmond Screw
Anchor Co. v. United States,0 an assignee of a patent sought to
recover against the Government under an exclusive remedy
statute s' but faced the possible loss of the cause of action under
the federal anti-assignment statute.8 2 The Court suggested that
to meet the test of due process, the exclusive remedy afforded
the assignee must be the exact equivalent of the remedy it replaced.88 Thus, the Court avoided application of the anti-assign76. Id., citing Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929). See text accompanying note 66 supra.
77. 225 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1963), citing Crane v. Hahlo, 258
U.S. 142 (1922). See text accompanying note 67 supra.
78. Docket No. 68-666-Civ-EC (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 15, 1968).
79. Id. The court similarly held that the accompanying provision,
28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1964), providing for removal of state court actions was unconstitutional and concluded that the federal government
could be nothing more than a voluntary party.
80. 275 U.S. 331 (1928).

81. Suit was brought under the Paient Infringement Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1498 (Supp.III, 1968). See text accompanying note 102 infra.
82. 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1964).

83. Richmond Screw Anchor Co.v,United States, 275 U.S. 331, 345
(1928),
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ment statute in order to save the constitutionality of the exclusive remedy.
A literal reading of this language would seem to invalidate
all substitute remedies, but it should be noted that the Richmond Court considered the assignability of claims "an important
element in their value,"84 making no mention of the many other
differences in value between a claim against the federal government and one against a private entity. Later, however, in Waite
v. United States,85 a court did allow interest on a patentee's claim
to make the compensation "entire." While questionable, this
decision has been read as reasserting the requirement of absolute equivalence alluded to in Richmond.8 6
At a minimum, the Supreme Court would seem to require
that the exclusive remedy not deprive the victim of any
"important element" in the value of his claim. The Jenkins
court-the first court to focus directly on the issue-has found
sufficient deprivation to strike down the exclusive remedy afforded by the Law. In view of the many differences in value
between a claim against the federal government under the Tort
Claims Act and one against a private individual, as hereafter
noted, 87 the Jenkins result may indeed be well-founded.
B.

DENIAL OF A JuRy TRIAL

Congress stated expressly that all actions brought against
the Government under the Tort Claims Act must be tried without
a jury.88 Since, under the Government Drivers Law, the victim's
exclusive remedy is against the federal government, 9 he is absolutely precluded from trying his action to a jury.
The seventh amendment expressly provides that in suits "at
common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved
.... ))Do Over the years, this language has been construed to
mean that a jury trial is guaranteed only in those actions which
would have been triable to a jury under common law when the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
supra.
89.
90.

Id.
57 Ct. CL 546 (1922).
See McCord, supra note 41.
See text, § IV infra.
28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1964). See text accompanying notes 33 & 34
28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. III, 1968).
The exact wording restricts this to suits "where the value in

controversy shall exceed twenty dollars

VII.

....

"

U.S. CoNsT. amend.
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91
This clearly does not inseventh amendment was adopted.
rights such as those
statutory
purely
clude actions based upon
the Supreme
Furthermore,
Act.
brought under the Tort Claims
Government
the
against
Court has explicitly held that actions
of
the seventh
are not suits at common law within the meaning
amendment since the United States is immune from suit at common law and the waiver of such immunity is subject to those
restrictions which Congress sees fit to impose, including the denial of a jury trial. 92
The question of the victim's right to a jury trial was not be95
94
fore the court in Gustafson 3 or Jenkins, but in Nistendirk
the court held that the Government Drivers Law did not unconstitutionally deny the victim the right to a jury trial. The
court declared that since the victim's exclusive remedy was a
statutory one against the Government, the guarantees of the seventh amendment were not applicable.9 6
The seventh amendment, however, preserves the victim's
right to a jury trial in a suit based upon the traditional common
law right against a tortfeasor.9 7 Thus, the jury trial question is,
for practical purposes, reduced to the basic question of whether
or not Congress may constitutionally substitute the statutory
98
But
remedy exclusively for the victim's common law remedy.
the difference in value of a jury claim and a nonjury claim 9 is a
valid consideration in such a determination and may have been

91. For a recent case originating in Minnesota and recognizing
this interpretation, see Klein v. Shell Oil Co., 386 F.2d 659 (8th Cir.
1967). See also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); United States
v. Certain Lands, 43 F. Supp. 418 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
92. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); McElrath v.
United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880). In Sherwood, it was held that the
Court of Claims is a "legislative court" and not a "constitutional court,"
and therefore Congress could dispense with a jury trial in actions
brought therein. See also Gustafson v. Peck, 216 F. Supp. 370, 372 (N.D.
Iowa 1963).
93. 216 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Iowa 1963). At that time, the seventh
amendment did not operate to guarantee a right to jury trial in a state
court and the issue was not raised with respect to the federal court.
Id. at 372.
94. Docket No. 68-666-Civ-EC (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 15, 1968).
95.

225 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo. 1963).

96. Id. at 882. The court also held that the government driver's
insurer who was impleaded by the federal government was not denied
its seventh amendment right to a jury trial since it must stand in the
shoes of the Government, which has no such right.
97. Id.
98. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
99. For a discussion of the difference, see text accompanying notes
132 & 133 infra.
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an underlying reason for the finding of unconstitutionality in
Jenkins.
Nevertheless, even if the exclusive remedy of the Government Drivers Law is constitutional on that ground, it is arguable that the victim's seventh amendment right to a jury trial
still cannot be denied by such an indirect means. 100 The historically strong federal policy favoring jury trials gives further
support to this contention. 10 1
C.

OTHER EXCLUSIVE REmDIES AGAINST THE FEDEuAL GoVESmTMET

Two other federal acts have exclusive provisions somewhat
analogous to that provided by the Government Drivers Law.
The Patent Infringement Act'0 2 grants the owner of a patent
the exclusive remedy of an action against the federal government in place of his infringement claim against a government
contractor. The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of the provision, 0 3 but the Patent Act and the Drivers Law differ in one very important aspect. The Patent Act substitutes an
exclusive statutory remedy for a prior statutory remedy 0 4 rather
than a common law remedy. The Suits in Admiralty Act'0 5
states that remedies provided by that Act with respect to vessels
or cargoes owned, operated or possessed by the federal govern100. See Singh, "What Cannot Be Done Directly Cannot Be Done
Indirectly": Its Meaning and Logical Status in Constitutionalism, 29
MODER L. REv. 273 (1966).
101. See Ballard v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 290
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Doughty v. Nebel Towing Co., 270 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.
La. 1967). These courts indicate that this policy is still viable today.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (a) (1964):
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent
of the United States is used or manufactured by or for the
United States without license of the owner thereof .

. . ,

the

owner's remedy shall be by action against the United States
...
for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation
for such use and manufacture.
This has been construed to provide an exclusive remedy. See Stelma,
Inc. v. Bridge Electronics Co., 300 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1962); Dearborn
Chemical Co. v. Arvey Corp., 114 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Ill. 1953).
103. Richmond Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331
(1928). See Yearsley v. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940); Hurley
v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932).
104. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1964): "A patentee shall have remedy by
civil action for infringement of his patent."
105. 46 U.S.C. § 745 (1964):
[W]here a remedy is provided . .. [under the Suits in Admiralty Act], it shall hereafter be exclusive of any other action by
reason of the same subject matter against the agent or employee of the United States. . . whose act or omission gave rise
to the claim.
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ment shall be exclusive of any other action against the employee whose act or omission gives rise to the claim. While no
court has directly concerned itself with the constitutionality of
this provision,106 the question again differs from that presented
by the Government Drivers Law. The remedy replaced by the
Suits in Admiralty Act is recognized only under the law of
admiralty; 10 7 it is not considered a part of the common law. 08
The uniqueness of the Government Drivers Law, therefore, gives
courts little, if any, precedent upon which to rely in dealing with
the questions of constitutionality presented by the exclusive
remedy.
IV. PROBLEMS OF BASIC FAIRNESS
The Government Drivers Law not only provides victims with
an exclusive remedy against the Government, but implicitly allows the defendant Government rather than the plaintiff to dictate the means by which suit may be brought. 0 9 This aspect of
the exclusive remedy not only may be determinative of its constitutionality"0 but presents some serious problems relating to
the basic fairness of the Law.
A. A

arsTnTPiE SETTLEmwT OF CLAIMS

A 1966 amendment to the Tort Claims Act requires that all
tort claims be presented to the appropriate federal agency for
settlement before suit may be instituted,"' and if denied, the
claimant may not sue for an amount in excess of the amount of
the claim presented. 1 2 For some victims these provisions for
106. See Tebbs v. Baker-Whitely Towing Co., 227 F. Supp. 656, 658
(D. Md. 1964), where an action against a United States Marshal was

dismissed on the basis of this provision.
107. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases in
admiralty. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
108. Like the prior patent infringement remedy, the Suits in Admiralty Act does not provide for a trial by jury. W. PsossER, LAw or
TORTs 445 (3d ed. 1964).
109. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
110. See text accompanying note 87 ,upra.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. I1, 1968).
See text accompanying note 30 supra. Prior to the amendment, courts
had construed the section to mean that the claimant was not initially
required to submit his claim for administrative settlement. See Whistler v. United States, 252 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Schlingman v.
United States, 229 F. Supp. 454 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
112. An exception is made where the increased amount is based
upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at the
time of presenting the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (Supp. I1, 1968).
See note 32 supra.
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administrative settlement will provide an efficient and equitable
procedure, but for others they may easily result in a cumbersome,
time-consuming and costly experience, since the Government's
liability is limited by the amount of the administrative claim.
Therefore, by refusing to pay the claim and going to court, the
Government has nothing to lose and much, if not all, to gain.
It is difficult to see how this procedure gives victims the bargaining power they have when settling claims under threat of
bringing suit for a greater amount.
B. TIME

LIMITATION UPON INSTITUTION OF SUIT

The Tort Claims Act requires that if an agency denies the

claim or proposes an unsatisfactory settlement, the claimant
must bring any court action within six months." 3 If the victim
presented his claim immediately after the accident involving the
government driver, a prompt denial by the appropriate agency

would bar victims in just over six months rather than the usual
time of two or three years under most state statutes of limita-

tion." 4 Courts have held that actions not timely brought under
the Tort Claims Act are not only dismissed with respect to the
Government but also with respect to the government driver since
otherwise the victim's remedy would not be exclusive as required."
Apart from considerations of the desirability of a
short or long time limit, many victims of accidents with government drivers ox their attorneys are undoubtedly without notice
of the special time limit imposed and consequently will be
barred by relying on their state statute." 6

C. DAMAGES ALLOWED
The Tort Claims Act specifically disallows recovery of punitive damages by the victim," 7 whereas most states permit the
113. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (Supp. I, 1968). See text accompanying
note 35 supra.
114. See, e.g., ILL. AmN. STAT. ch. 83, § 15 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (two
years); MicH. CoMP. LAWS § 600.5805(7) (1968) (three years); MINN.
STAT. § 541.07 (1967) (two years); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 214 (McKinney
1963) (three years). The same problem is likely to exist with respect
to shorter periods. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRo. § 340 (West 1954) (one year).
115. See Reynaud v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mo.
1966); Hoch v. Carter, 242 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Fancher v.
Baker, 240 Ark. 288, 399 S.W.2d 280 (1966).
116. See the dissenting opinion in Fancher v. Baker, 240 Ark. 288,
399 S.W.2d 280 (1966), claiming that the Government Drivers Law is
unconstitutional on the ground that Congress was forbidden from shortening the state statute of limitations.
117. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1964). See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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award of such damages where warranted by the circumstances.11 8 Willful or wanton misconduct such as drunken driving" 9 is generally required by the states, but this type of con120
duct is clearly within the purview of the exclusive remedy.
In addition, the victim of an accident with a government
driver is deprived of all interest prior to judgment, regardless of state laws providing for the running of interest from
the commencement of the action.' 21 The court in Jenkins, however, suggested that the victim may have a constitutional right
22
to the recovery of these damages.
The requirement that the suit be tried without a jury is
likely to further diminish the amoumt recovered by victims and
may even affect their chances of recovery at all. Statistics from
a recent survey 23 suggest that the victim forced to bring suit
under the Tort Claims Act should expect at least 25 percent less
in damages and an eight percent decrease in his chance of any
recovery at all because of his inability to proceed against the
Government in a jury trial. The victim can also expect 10 percent less in damages because of his inability to go against the
driver individually. 24 Apart from the question of what recovery
of damages is most appropriate, the disparity exists merely because the victim was unfortunate enough to be involved in an
accident with a government driver.

118. W. PRossER, supra note 108, at !. See C. MCCORMIcxK, DAMAGES
§ 278 (1935); Note, Exemplary Damages In the Law of Torts, 70 HARv.
L. REV.517 (1957).
119. See Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954),
where the court held that actual malice is not necessary to allow punitive damages for drunken driving.
120. For coverage by the Tort Claims Act, see text accompanying
note 25 supra. Such conduct is also clearly within the "scope of employment," under the Government Drivers Law. See note 43 supra;
W. PRossER, supra note 108, at 476.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2411(b) (1964). See text accompanying note 36
supra.
122. Docket No. 68-666-Civ-EC (S.D. Fla., filed Aug. 15, 1968):
Thus, plaintiff's common law right to sue the active tortfeasor
is completely abridged by section 2679. Further, any right the
plaintiff may have to recover punitive damages or interest before judgment is removed by the operation of this statute.
123. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L.
REV. 744, 750 (1959).

124. Id. Statistics show, however, that on the question of finding
liability with respect to the individual defendant, judges and juries
find for the victim in nearly the same percentage of cases. Id.
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D. FELLOW EMPLOYEES AS VICTnMS
When the victim of the accident caused by a government

driver is a fellow employee of the Government, the exclusive
remedy against the Government provided by the Government
Drivers Law has even further reaching implications. Under the
Federal Employees Compensation Act, 2 5 the compensation benefits provided to federal employees are exclusive and in place
of all other liability of the Government including liability under
the Tort Claims Act. 120 Courts have allowed victims to bring
suit against fellow employee tortfeasors who are not government
drivers. 127 On the other hand, the federal employee who is a
victim in an accident with a government driver has been held
to be entitled exclusively to benefits under the Federal Embring suit either against
ployees Compensation Act and may not
2
the driver or the federal government.
While the Compensation Act provides a comprehensive
schedule of payments for various types of disabling injuries and
for death, its payments are based on wage-earning capacity and
do not provide for many elements of damages which might be
included in a judicial award. 2 9 For example, the Compensation
Act makes no provision for pain, suffering, nondisabling disfigurement, loss of services or loss of companionship. 130 Thus the
125. 5 U.S.C. § 757(b) (1964). See S. REP. No. 836, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess., 23, 30 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 729, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 14-15 (1949).
126. See Posegate v. United States, 288 F.2d 11, 14 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 832 (1961); Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427,
435-37 (1952).
This exclusivity provision, however, has a different
basis than that in the Government Drivers Law since in the former,
the employee is in essence contracting out of his right to sue by working
for the federal government. Private citizens, on the other hand, are not
parties to such a contract.
127. See Allman v. Hanley, 302 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1962). However,
the Government is entitled to reimbursement for the amount recovered by the victim-employee. 5 U.S.C. § 8173 (1964), as amended,
(Supp. III, 1968).
128. See Beechwood v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 926 (D. Mont.
1967); Noga v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Cal. 1967). But see
Gilliam v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Ky. 1967), where the court
declared the language too ambiguous to find that Congress had intended such an inroad upon the claimant's rights. For a comprehensive
discussion, see L.

(3)

JAYSON,

HANDLING

FEDERAL

ToRT CLAMs

§ 154.02

(1967).
129. See L. JAYSON, supranote 128, at § 154.02 (5).
130. See various provisions of the Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 751
et seq. (1965). See also Posegate v. United States, 288 F.2d 11 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 832 (1961) (injuries resulted in impotency,
which is not compensable under Compensation Act, but Tort Claims
suit was dismissed); Thol v. United States, 218 F.2d 12 (9th Cr. 1954)
(same result in suit for loss of comfort and society).
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injured fellow employee of the government driver has no judi3
cial recourse and is all but at the mercy of the Government.' 1
E. DEPLETION OF GoVERmiENT RESOURCES
The major impact of the excl.usive remedy of the Government Drivers Law is undeniably upon the victim, but an often
unrecognized burden is also placed upon the federal government
and ultimately, of course, upon the taxpayers.
While at common law vicarious liability provides victims
with a remedy against the tortfeasor's superior, the superior has
a right to subrogation against the tortfeasor himself.132 The federal government, however, has been held not to have this right
to subrogation against the driver, 1:33 thereby affording the driver
absolute immunity with respect to both the victim and the Government.
The Government has a responsibility not only to protect its
drivers from financial burdens but a fiduciary responsibility to
all taxpayers not to unduly deplete government resources. Thus,
it is questionable whether the taxpayers, rather than the government driver, should bear the financial burden of the proximate consequences of all nonintentional acts committed by the
34
driver, including conduct such as drunken driving.
V. PROPOSALS
Any proposal to change the present law must necessarily be
aimed at accommodating to the fullest extent the interests of all
the parties involved-the government driver, the federal government, the victim and the taxpaying public. Since the purpose
of a civil tort action is to compensate the victim for damages
suffered, 13 5 the interest of the victim who is involved in an ac131. One commentator has called this interaction of the Tort Claims

Act and the Employee Compensation Act unconstitutional under the
Richmond rationale. See Thornock, Exclusive Remedy Provision of
the Federal Employees' Compensation Act-Fact or Fiction?, 42 MIL.
L. REV. 1 (1968).

132. See, e.g., Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia,
161 U.S. 316, 328 (1896). For a general discussion of vicarious liability, see W. PROSSER, supra note 108, at 470.
133. See United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954). Where the
Government recovers from the driver's insurer, the action is based on
the inclusion of the government as an insured under the terms of the
insurance contract. Id. See also Taggert v. United States, 262 F. Supp.
572 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
134. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
135. W. PROSSER, supra note 108, a 7.
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cident with a government driver must be of primary importance.
Most of the inequities in the present law can be traced to
the impact of the exclusivity requirement upon procedures of
the Tort Claims Act-originally designed to be used as an alternative remedy. Modifying these procedures for claims required to be exclusively brought under the Act would likely provide the victim of an accident caused by a government driver
with a remedy more closely approaching the remedy afforded
other accident victims. For example, eliminating the requirement of a mandatory administrative presentation of the claim in
favor of optional procedures for such a settlement would not
only avoid costly and time consuming formalities for some victims, but would avoid placing a ceiling on the amount for which
these victims could later bring suit. Likewise, the enactment of
legislation allowing a jury on request would not unduly burden
federal courts and would more equitably resolve the issue of
damages.
Obviously, the constitutional questions presented by the exclusive remedy can best be avoided by repealing the Government
Drivers Law, thereby assuring the victim of his usual choice of
defendants. By itself, however, this would expose the government driver to either the financial burden of carrying liability
insurance or personal liability if he is the victim's choice of defendants. Furthermore, if the victim chose to sue the Government, he would be faced with the same procedures as now exist
under the Tort Claims Act.
The most equitable solution might be to enact legislation
which places the federal government in a capacity similar to that
of an insurer. To avoid prejudice in state courts, actions could
still be required to be brought in a federal court but victims could
be provided an optional advisory jury and other procedures
closely reflecting procedures in other personal injury suits. Since
the Government would be liable only within the terms of its
"insurance contract," government drivers would be deterred
from acting with such disregard of others that they could be
held personally liable. Moreover, the Government would not
be liable for willful or wanton misconduct and thus, the allocation of damages would result in the taxpaying public carrying
no more than its fair share of the burden.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The outdated doctrine of sovereign immunity has commendably been replaced by governmental responsibility for torts com-
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mitted by federal government employees while acting within
the scope of their employment. Nevertheless, the present law's
exclusive remedy for damages resulting from the negligent operation of motor vehicles by government drivers balances on
the edge of unconstitutionality under the fifth and seventh
amendments. Furthermore, the law seems to favor unduly the
Government and its drivers. Recovery in some cases by the
United States against the driver's liability insurer suggests that
the intended purpose of the present law-to relieve drivers of
the financial burden of carrying their own liability insurancehas not been fulfilled. A victim involved in an accident with a
government driver must proceed according to the defendant Government's procedures and even then is unlikely to receive compensation comparable to that of the victim in ordinary personal
injury actions. Likewise, little consideration is given to the possible encouragement of irresponsible conduct on the part of government drivers and the unfair allocation of damages upon the
taxpaying public.
The most equitable resolution of the conflicting interests
would seem to be legislation making the federal government an
insurer of its drivers. The crucial factor requiring a "fair" remedy is the necessarily close contact of government drivers with
the activities of most private citizens. This demands that the
citizen involved in an accident with a driver who happens to be
a government employee be compensated to the same extent as
other accident victims.

